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Digital constitutionalism: Using the rule of law to evaluate the legitimacy of
governance by platforms
Nicolas Suzor
Platforms govern users, and the way that platforms govern matters. In
this paper, I propose that the legitimacy of governance of users by
platforms should be evaluated against the values of the rule of law.  In
particular, I suggest that we should care deeply about the extent to
which private governance is consensual; transparent; equally applied
and relatively stable; fairly enforced; and respects substantive human
rights. These are the core values of good governance, but are alien to
the systems of contract law that currently underpin relationships
between platforms and their users. Through an analysis of the
contractual terms of service of 15 major social media platforms, I
show how these values can be applied to evaluate governance, and
how poorly platforms perform on these criteria. 
The values of the rule of law provide a language to name and work
through contested concerns about the relationship between platforms
and their users. This is a necessary precondition to an increasingly
urgent task. The law of contract does not address these governance
concerns, and the concept of constitutional rights does not extend to
governance by private actors. Finding a way to apply these values to
articulate a set of desirable restraints on the exercise of power in the
digital age is the key challenge and opportunity of the project of
digital constitutionalism.   
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PART I INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Facebook suffered a backlash for proposing to change its terms of service without adequately
consulting its community. Mark Zuckerberg (2009) pledged that from then on, Facebook users would
have direct input on the site's terms of service:
Our terms aren't just a document that protect our rights; it's the governing document for how 
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the service is used by everyone across the world. Given its importance, we need to make sure 
the terms reflect the principles and values of the people using the service.
Since this will be the governing document that we'll all live by, Facebook users will have a lot
of input in crafting these terms.
Facebook never really lived up to its promise of direct democratic participation. In May 2009, Facebook
renamed its 'Terms of Use' to a 'Statement of Rights and Responsibilities' that included a mechanism for
Facebook's users to vote on proposed changes to the terms of service. The vote would be binding on
Facebook if more than 30% of its active userbase participated. i This turned out to be an unrealistically
high threshold. By the end of 2012, Facebook had rolled back its commitment to binding votes, as well as
introducing controversial changes to its privacy policy, in a process opposed by 88% of the 668,872
people who voted – a group that represented less than 1% of the more than one billion registered users at
the time (Schrage 2012), much fewer than the 30% required. Some time after October 2014, an edit was
made to Facebook's blog, and Zuckerberg's comments were disavowed, attributed instead to a former
Facebook employee who left the firm in 2010.ii 
This year marks twenty years since John Perry Barlow's famous Declaration of the Independence of
Cyberspace (1996). The rousing text expresses an ambition that the internet provides the opportunities for
diverse communities to set rules that reflect the shared values of their participants, and together develop
new social contracts that protect the liberties of all participants. Barlow's hope is that the governance that
will emerge from diverse online social spaces will be “more humane and fair” than that of territorial
governments. The core theoretical claim here is that the infinite possibilities of a world where association
is not limited by geography or physical resources should enable communities to enact rules that more
closely align with their values than any system of representative democracy could achieve (Johnson &
Post 1995).
Twenty years on, a great deal of work remains to be done to ensure that online governance is legitimate
and fair. The liberating democratic potential of social media has not yet come (Sandvig 2015). Facebook's
limited experiment with voting reflects a growing unease over the governance of our shared social spaces.
In the time since then, concerns over governance have multiplied and intensified. Some of the most
visible controversies revolve around privacy and the extent that users consent to the sharing of detailed
data about their lives and activities with both advertisers and nation states. Others focus on the visibility
of content, as platforms seek to rank and order information on the basis of individual relevance, on
criteria that are generally not well explained, and that sometimes appear to be deeply biased. And in
recent times, calls have markedly increased for platforms to be more accountable for the way that they
moderate speech – both from groups seeking enhanced responsibility from platforms to tackle abuse, and
groups seeking strong restrictions on the extent to which platforms censor speech. As software continues
to ‘eat the world’ (Andreessen 2011), these issues extend beyond communications platforms to massive e-
commerce marketplaces and the rapidly emerging peer economy platforms that use digital networks to
coordinate the provision of goods and services across a broad range of social life. The role of digital
platforms as ‘architects of public spaces’ (Gillespie 2017, p.25) raises concerns that they ought to be more
accountable to the public for the ways in which they create and enforce the rules that govern our
interactions.
In this Article, I argue that the governance of platforms raises fundamental constitutional concerns – in
the sense of very real concerns over how these social spaces are constituted and how the exercise of
power ought to be constrained. In Part II, I show how these are concerns are emerging in a disparate set of
controversies across a range of different platforms involving diverse groups of stakeholders, including
users, business, governments, and civil society. As these concerns continue to intensify, I argue that they
are not able to be adequately conceptualized or articulated using the existing and familiar tools of contract
law. In Part III, I propose a framework for evaluating the legitimacy of governance of platforms based on
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the values of the rule of law. There are good claims that at least some of these values – transparency,
predictability, procedural fairness, and consent – are universal values of good governance. While rule of
law values have historically been limited to the public sphere, this liberal assumption systematically
undervalues the important role that decentralized, private actors play in governing social life. In a
networked environment that is almost fully owned by private actors, these tensions are visible now more
than ever. By examining the contractual Terms of Service of 15 major platforms, I show how a rule of law
framework provides the analytical tools and the language to conceptualize what is at stake in the
governance of platforms. I argue that these constitutional values help to make explicit the core concern of
online governance: that control over behavior is exercised in a way that is not accountable to the people
who are affected. 
The rule of law framework I propose is not prescriptive – there are legitimate reasons why we would not
want decisions to be either accountable or predictable. It does, however, help us to understand the
importance of real consent when these fundamental protections are given up. This reframing ultimately
provides a useful lens through which to consider what limits should be imposed on the autonomy of
platforms in order to increase the legitimacy of online governance. I conclude by arguing that the linked
concepts of rights of users and responsibilities of platforms provide a useful way of making explicit
concerns over the constitution of our shared online social spaces. The values of the rule of law provide the
language that is needed to express these concerns and progress the project of 'digital constitutionalism'
that seeks to articulate and realize appropriate standards of legitimacy for governance in the digital age.
PART II THE GOVERNANCE OF PLATFORMS
The ways in which platforms are governed matters. Platforms mediate the way people communicate, and
the decisions they make have a real impact on public culture and the social and political lives of their
users (Gillespie 2015; DeNardis & Hackl 2015). Facebook’s experiment with democratic ideals neatly
illustrates the disconnect between the social values at stake and the hard legal realities. At law, Terms of
Service are contractual documents that set up a simple consumer transaction: in exchange for access to
the platform, users agree to be bound by the terms and conditions set out. In legal terms, it makes no
sense to talk in terms of governance in these consumer transactions in any more than the broadest of
senses. Zuckerberg's proclamation recognizes a truth the law does not: contractual terms of service do
play an important role in governance. They are constitutional documents in that they form an integral
component of the ways in which our shared social spaces are constituted and governed.
Generally speaking, the Terms of Service documents that structure the online social spaces we inhabit
allocate a great deal of power to the operators. Particularly for large, corporate platforms, these terms of
service are generally written in a way that is designed to safeguard the commercial interests of platform
providers. In legal terms, the discretion of the platform owner is practically absolute. The legal
relationship of providers to users is one of firm to consumer, not sovereign to citizen (Grimmelmann
2009). Platforms strenuously resist any suggestion that their networks are in any sense public spaces. This
is important because no concept of legitimacy in governance or constitutional limits on the exercise of
governance powers exists within the core of commercial contract law. The language of constitutional
rights has almost no application in the 'private' sphere; constitutional law applies only to 'public' actions
(Berman 2000). This means that the notion of any constitutional rights – freedom of speech and
association, requirements of due process and natural justice, rights to participate in the democratic process
– have almost no legal weight. These rights, where they exist, all apply only against the state, not private
actors. 
The result is that users have very little legal redress for complaints about how platforms are governed.
Users are thought of as consumers who have voluntarily accepted the terms of participation in private
networks. Having accepted and adopted these terms, users are legally bound by them. The legal answer to
concerns users have about the governance of platforms is, largely: if you don't like it, leave.
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Platforms also work hard to avoid any perception that they are in any sense responsible to third parties for
what their users do on their networks. They do this primarily by limiting the extent to which they are seen
to be governing their users. By presenting themselves as neutral intermediaries, mere carriers of content
and facilitators of conversations, platforms seek to avoid the implication that they may be responsible for
how their users behave or how their systems are designed and deployed (Gillespie 2010). At the same
time, platforms have strong incentives to shape the way their users act and interact in order to satisfy the
varied and often conflicting demands from and within different user communities, civil society groups,
advertisers, businesses, and governments. This is a delicate balancing act: platforms at once express their
neutrality and their absolute discretion, as businesses and owners of private property, to manage their
affairs and control their networks. 
Platforms, of course, are not neutral. Their architecture (Lessig 2006) and algorithms (Gillespie 2014)
shape how people communicate and what information is presented to participants. Their policies and
terms of use are expressed in formally neutral terms but the powers they provide are carefully wielded
and selectively enforced (Humphreys 2007). Their ongoing governance processes are shaped by complex
socio-economic (Dijck & Poell 2013) socio-technical (Crawford & Gillespie 2014) structures, and the
interplay of emergent social norms (Taylor 2006). As systems that mediate between users, platforms can
never be neutral in any real sense of the word – ‘platforms intervene’ (Gillespie 2015).
The contractual Terms of Service documents are one of the primary legal sites of conflict as platforms
resist demands to change the way they govern their networks. These contracts must accordingly do double
duty. For users, the subjects of regulation, they reserve to the platform complete discretion to control how
the network works and how it is used. For those who would ask that platforms exercise their power to
control behavior for other ends – including users themselves, copyright owners and other third parties
with grievances, and governments who seek to surveil users or censor content – the Terms are structured
to disclaim any liability or responsibility for how autonomous users act. This duality can only be achieved
with the assistance of the rhetorical claim that platforms are inherently private spaces. It rests on the
assertion of a fundamental distinction: platforms have the technical ability and the legal right to control
how their systems are used, but do not bear the moral or legal responsibility for what users do. This
distinction works on the basis that users are fully autonomous, rational actors in a liberal marketplace.
They consent to the platform’s control as the price of entry, but they retain personal responsibility for
their actions.
This positioning of platforms is becoming increasingly tenuous in the face of increasing pressure on many
different fronts. Across many different areas of law and in many different countries around the world,
platforms are facing mounting pressure to exercise greater control over their users. Platforms are
attractive targets for regulating internet content; they are often the ‘least cost avoider’ (Lichtman &
Landes 2002): it is much easier for a major platform to remove content or police speech than it is to find
and target the individual responsible for it. Often, the only effective and scalable way to regulate the
actions of people on the internet is through online intermediaries (Goldsmith & Wu 2006). Faced with a
pressing need to tackle bad behavior, this efficient ability to act can quickly shade into claims of a moral
responsibility (Pappalardo 2014).
Copyright law has long been one of the major battlegrounds and provides a useful example. The
immunity that platforms receive under the US  Digital Millennium Copyright Act come with ‘notice &
takedown’ obligations that require platforms to remove infringing content that their users post. Google
alone now receives over 65 million takedown notices each month for its search engine results from
copyright owners (Google Inc 2016). Under continuing pressure from copyright owners, Google and
other giants have moved to do much more than they are strictly required to by law (Urban et al. 2016) and
rightsholders are now seeking legislative changes that would require all intermediaries to do more to
combat infringement (Rosati 2016; Suzor & Fitzgerald 2011; Giblin 2014).
The relative success of copyright takedown has prompted calls for platforms to do more in other areas.
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Apart from copyright law, platforms have enjoyed almost absolute protection in the US from legal
responsibility for the acts of their users for many years under Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act. There is a growing perception that s 230 will not survive as such a broad shield much
longer. The protection it provides may no longer reflect the expectations society has of the role that
platforms ought to play in helping to address harm on their networks (Grimmelmann 2015). Already,
faced with plaintiffs who have clearly suffered harm but have no recourse against individual wrongdoers,
US courts are increasingly finding reasons to limit or circumvent its protection (Goldman 2016). By
characterizing the role of platforms as enabling, encouraging, or amplifying harmful content, courts have
been able to find them legally responsible as active participants in the wrongful acts. Pressure is slowly
but steadily mounting to reexamine s 230; from hate speech and abuse to revenge porn to defamation to
extremist speech, platforms are increasingly being asked to do more to respond to harmful content on
their networks (Citron 2014; Shepherd et al. 2015; Browne-Barbour 2015).
Outside of the US, these pressures have gone further. Platforms are sometimes able to avoid demands of
foreign legal systems by structuring their businesses so that they can operate globally but retain the
protections of US law, but not always. The European Court of Justice’s ‘Right to be Forgotten’
determination is a key example among several where search engines have been obliged to remove links to
content on privacy grounds (CJEU 2014; Bernal 2014). Global online intermediaries now find themselves
in ongoing and repeated efforts to ward off attempts from courts, legislatures, and executive governments
around the world to enlist them in policing internet content (Frosio n.d.).   
The influence of governments around the world on internet governance has itself given rise to new
conflicts and pressures on platforms. Governments are increasingly requiring online intermediaries to
disclose information about their users and to block access to content they deem objectionable or unlawful
(Commissioner for Human Rights 2014). In this context, governments have been able to avoid the
constraints of constitutional law on surveillance and censorship by leaning on private platforms to do the
work on their behalf – a technique known as an ‘invisible handshake’ (Birnhack & Elkin-Koren 2003). In
response, civil society groups and telecommunications industry lobbies have started to strongly contest
the role of platforms in public regulatory projects. Critically, as platforms are increasingly being coopted
to play substantial roles on behalf of governments, the claim that they are wholly private spaces has
become more difficult to sustain. 
Particularly in the wake of the Snowden revelations (Greenwald 2014), there is a growing global unease
about how the rights of individuals can be protected online. Sir Tim Berners-Lee, for example, has
recently called for a 'Magna Carta for the Web' (Kiss 2014) to protect the rights of individuals, and the
W3C's 'Web We Want' initiative has taken up the campaign. This initiative builds on others before it, like
the Internet Rights and Principles Coalition's charter (IPRC 2014) and the Global Network Initiative's
principles (2012). Many other declarations and campaigns from civil society groups have echoed these
calls, which are fundamentally clustered along classic liberal priorities: decentralized power, formal
equality (in the form of network neutrality), freedom of expression, and privacy rights. These initiatives
are explicitly positioned in opposition to interference from state actors – demands from various
governments to collect and disclose information on the activities of individuals, to remove or block access
to prohibited information, and to engineer networks and technologies in ways that facilitate surveillance
and law enforcement. The advocacy groups working in internet governance are able to clearly articulate
principles that user interests (privacy, freedom of expression) should be protected from interference from
governments and the operation of state copyright and other intermediary liability laws. These principles
align directly with the commercial interests of the telecommunications industry, who are able to bring
money and weight to bear in global politics of resistance to state interference. One of the primary public
ways in which this is done is through 'transparency reports', where intermediaries increasingly publish
details about government demands for information or censorship and content removal requests by third
parties under copyright or privacy laws. 
By contrast, the internal, ‘self-governance’ practices of intermediaries is where pressure for better
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governance is most dispersed and least visible. As a rule, intermediaries are not promoting transparency
about their own practices in policing content and enforcing their terms of service (MacKinnon et al. 2014).
Unlike well-funded copyright owners and powerful state governments, the users who care deeply about
how content is regulated are not as well-organized or influential on the policies of platforms. Lacking
either armies or armies of lawyers and lobbyists, user interests are not well represented in governance
debates. The problem is exacerbated by a fundamental conflict and uncertainty within civil society – and
often within civil society organizations. There is no consensus about the extent to which users need
protection from the governance decisions of platforms themselves. The lack of a language of rights and
clearly articulated concepts of the responsibility of platforms makes it difficult to even discuss the
legitimate concerns that both users and platforms have (Suzor 2010).
The need for a language of users’ rights is becoming increasingly pressing. In diverse and very loosely
organized ways, users continuously seeking to renegotiate the social contract that sets out their
relationships to platforms. Social media platforms, like any social spaces, involve power relationships and
political contests over power. These political struggles sometimes manifest as high profile controversies
over how power is exercised – including, for example, questions of censorship, bias in algorithmic
content selection and curation, and responses to abuse and harassment perpetrated through social media
(Nahon 2016). In practice, the agency of users to contest rulesets is relatively limited, although organized
and sustained actions by groups of users, coordinated by groups like Women, Action, and the Media! have
sometimes been effective enough to pressure platform owners to change the Terms of Service (Matias et
al. 2015). But without any consensus over whether users even have interests that can be expressed as
'rights' that apply against platforms in a way that overrides the contractual terms of service, these
struggles only ever proceed slowly and in isolation.
This is the project of digital constitutionalism: to rethink how the exercise of power ought to be limited
(made legitimate) in the digital age (Fitzgerald 2000). The task of identifying and developing social,
technical, and legal approaches that can improve the legitimacy of online governance is an increasingly
pressing issue (Brown & Marsden 2013; DeNardis 2014; Mansell 2012). The rationale for extending
principles of good governance and human rights to private platforms lies in an increasing recognition of
the important role that platforms play in mediating communication (Gillespie 2015). The rules of online
social spaces and the ways they are enforced have real impact on the human rights of users (Kaye 2016;
Council of Europe 2012). Recognition of this point has led to increasing calls for a new way of thinking
about governance by platforms, and a more substantive understanding of constitutional rights in online
governance (Crawford & Lumby 2013; Langlois 2013).
This work is beginning. Initiatives like the Ranking Digital Rights project ‘Corporate Responsibility
Index’ (2015) seek to hold online intermediaries accountable for their commitments to protecting human
rights. The United Nations Internet Governance Forum's Dynamic Coalition on Platform Responsibility
(DCPR) draft Recommendations on Terms of Service and Human Rights (2015) is one example that seeks
to articulate a set of minimum and optimal standards for Terms of Service. In the draft recommendations,
the DCPR attempts to create an expectation that private platforms will not only resist illegitimate pressure
imposed by different state and non-state actors to censor information or hand over information about
users, but also to conduct themselves in a way that does not infringe human rights standards. 
These initiatives represent a marked shift from traditional conceptions of human and constitutional rights,
which typically apply only against nation states. They reflect an evolving global understanding of the role
of businesses in protecting human rights, and an emerging recognition that businesses should do more to
embed protections for human rights in their day-to-day operations (CSR Europe 2016). Under the UN's
tri-partite 'responsibility' framework (Ruggie 2008), while States still have the primary duty for protecting
human rights, businesses have a responsibility to respect rights and help to provide effective remedies
against their violation. The DCPR's recommendations are rooted in the UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights, which explicitly cast businesses as owing a responsibility to “avoid
infringing on the human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which
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they are involved” (United Nations 2011). Importantly, states also have an ongoing responsibility to
ensure that domestic laws – like contract law – are designed to ensure that businesses respect human
rights, but this principle has not yet been embedded in the way that domestic legal systems treat Terms of
Service. 
PART III THE PRINCIPLES OF THE RULE OF LAW
Evaluating the legitimacy of private online governance requires a useful set of conceptual measures of
good governance in private platforms. I propose that the constitutional values of the rule of law can
provide a useful way to evaluate the legitimacy of online governance. This is not a straightforward
exercise; law generally does not recognize that private actors owe any form of constitutional duties. This
strong division between public and private becomes problematic once it is clear that regulation is not
only, or even not primarily, done by the state (Black 2001; Burris et al. 2005; Grabosky 1994). The strong
liberal distinction between public and private spheres has been heavily critiqued over the last two decades
by regulatory scholars. But there is still a clear need to further explore how constitutional values and
rights can be protected once the idea of governance is decentralized (Black 2008; Grabosky 2013;
Morgan 2007). 
Taking a definition of regulation that includes all ‘organized efforts to manage the course of events in a
social system’ (Burris et al. 2008, p.3), it is clear that private actors often play a very significant role in
regulating social behavior. A growing body of literature now seeks to reconceptualize the role of the state
in a 'decentralized', (Black 2001) 'pluralized' (Parker 2008), or networked (Crawford 2006; Shearing &
Wood 2003; Burris et al. 2005) regulatory environment. In the context of digital media platforms,
widening the governance lens beyond governments requires “[accounting] for a diverse, contested
environment of agents with differing levels of power and visibility: users, algorithms, platforms,
industries and governments.” (Crawford & Lumby 2013, p.9). 
The rule of law provides one way to evaluate the legitimacy of governance in a normative sense (Huggins
2017). The core of the idea of the rule of law is that governments ought to wield their power in a way that
is authorized and subject to the law (Raz 1977). The values of the rule of law are principles of good
governance. The way that these principles have historically been applied has been state-centric. This
paper seeks to apply these principles to the governance of digital media, paying particular attention to the
role of platforms as writers of the rules of participation, designers of technology that enables
communication and constrains action, developers of algorithms that sort, organize, highlight and suppress
content, and employers of human moderators who enforce rules on acceptable content and behavior.
It is important to note at the outset that the obligation on platforms to respect human rights implicates
both procedural and substantive concerns. The substantive issues are extremely complex. They involve
difficult jurisdictional questions and serious issues of conflicts of rights and liberties (Svantesson 2014).
These are crucially important issues about which we do not have consensus. A set of constitutional values
for the good governance of platforms will not look like the substantive bills of rights that are familiar to
territorial governance. There are no universal substantive rights that will hold for all platforms at all
times. But neither is it the case that the legitimacy of governance is unknowably subjective. This is the
liberal fallacy that must be avoided; the 'neutral' mechanisms of property or contract are illusory, and
cannot be relied upon to reliably lead us to optimal governance regimes through the invisible hand of the
market. There will be no easy answers here – no approach in this contested arena will be universally
acceptable. This is a largely political project; it requires difficult negotiations about the types of
communities and platforms we want to create and the legal and social norms that are appropriate to
achieving those goals.
In this paper, I focus on the procedural issues – the baseline set of protections for due process that are
almost universally accepted as a fundamental requirement of the rule of law. Within this contested arena,
the legitimacy of governance can be thought of in terms of two distinct but interrelated groupings of
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concerns. The first is the basic principle that the exercise of power is limited. This is a requirement that
those enforcing the law are themselves bound by valid laws. Primarily, this is a fetter on the arbitrary
exercise of power; as we will see, this is a sense in which contractual Terms of Service fail almost
completely. The second set of concerns revolve around ‘procedural’ values (in the sense of ‘due process’
or ‘natural justice’): that rules must be transparent, equally applied, relatively stable, and fairly enforced
(Trebilcock & Daniels 2008). On this set of measures, too, the Terms of Service of platforms generally
fare extremely poorly – the terms rarely reflect how governance operates in practice. 
In order to contextualize and illustrate the analysis of the legitimacy of contractual governance
documents, I examine the legal terms and conditions of fifteen of the largest English-language social
media platforms. I selected the fifteen largest platforms by traffic, iii on the basis that the largest platforms
are those that are likely to have the most significant impact on the civil and political rights of their users.
Note that this sample is highly western- and US-centric; it omits most major non-English language social
media platforms. For this initial stage, it was useful to constrain analysis to contracts generally governed
by common law systems in general and US law in particular, but future work should extend this further.
Each contractual document was analyzed to identify the extent to which they provided protections for due
process interests of users. This analysis focused on five key issues: limitations on power; procedures for
suspending and terminating accounts; transparency, including both clarity of the rules themselves and
transparency in processes for enforcing the rules; mechanisms for changing the rules; and dispute
resolution processes. 
A Governance limited by law
The primary requirement of legitimacy for legal systems is that power is not exercised arbitrarily (Dicey
1959, p.188). This is ultimately the basic value of the rule of law – that power is wielded in a way that is
accountable, that those in positions of power abide by the rules, and that those rules should only be
changed by appropriate procedures within appropriate limits. In this limited, procedural sense, there is
good reason to believe that the rule of law is a universal human good – that all societies benefit from
restraints on the arbitrary or malicious exercise of power (Tamanaha 2004, p.137; Thompson 1990,
p.266).
This prohibition on the arbitrary exercise of power provides a very useful criterion through which to
measure the legitimacy of the governance of platforms. One of the most concerning characteristics of
private governance is that it is very seldom transparent, clear, or predictable, and providers often purport
to have absolute discretion on the exercise of their power to eject under both contract and property law.
Essentially, providers have control over the code that creates the platform, allowing them to exercise
absolute power within the community itself.  The exercise of this power is limited by the market and by
emergent social norms, but it is barely limited by law. Take, for example, the Facebook Terms of Service,
as they were before they were updated due to user protest in May 2009, which provided that Facebook 
may terminate your membership, delete your profile and any content or information that you 
have posted on the Site [...] and/or prohibit you from using or accessing the Service or the Site
[...] for any reason, or no reason, at any time in its sole discretion, with or without notice[.]
Most of the Terms of Service in our sample use similar language that very clearly reserves to the platform
the right to terminate user accounts at any time. Most also included an explicit extension that termination
could be for any or no reason, at the service provider's sole discretion. 
The only outlier was Facebook (Instagram, which was acquired by Facebook, uses almost identical
Terms). Following Facebook's decision to replace its contractual terms with a more accessible 'Statement
of Rights and Responsibilities', this language was significantly watered down to read:
If you violate the letter or spirit of this Statement, or otherwise create risk or possible legal 
exposure for us, we can stop providing all or part of Facebook to you.
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Even though this clause was the most generous to users from our sample, it is still broad enough to
provide the platform with almost complete control over the relationship. Facebook's Terms became more
readable, but this change was primarily cosmetic. 
The core value of the rule of law, as a prohibition on the arbitrary exercise of power, provides a simple
and powerful framework through which to articulate why this clause is so concerning. These termination
clauses are particularly concerning because they set the ultimate baseline for any disputes over
governance. By explicitly allocating broad discretion to platforms to terminate access on any grounds,
these terms seek to firmly keep the political processes of governance outside of any legal standards of
review. These terms represent a clear claim by platforms that the rule of law does not apply to disputes
over access to the platform. Where platforms can exercise control over access, by extension, they are able
to make access conditional upon accepting any other written or unwritten rule. These clauses are the legal
lynchpin of a governance strategy that participants must submit to the authority of the platform in order to
gain access ('take it or leave it'). 
These legal clauses are not designed to be routinely used in any practical legal sense; rather, they are a
line of ultimate defense, to which platforms turn specifically to exclude legal review of their governance.
In this way, these clauses harness contract law to enforce a strict division of the public and private sphere.
The software code and physical network infrastructure upon which platforms are built are, legally
speaking, the private property of platform owners. Conceptually, this is predicated on both a conception
of social media as a 'place', capable of being privately owned (Cohen 2007), and the exalted place that
private property holds in our legal system. The protection of private property forms the basis of much of
classical natural law and liberal theory; Blackstone's characterization of property as “that sole and
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe” (Blackstone 1770, p.2) has had a lasting
effect on the way that the law approaches questions of private governance. When this metaphor is
transposed to networked space, it becomes even stronger – rights to exclude people from accessing digital
servers can become absolute in ways that private property never could, and traditional public rights of
access are largely forgotten (Carrier & Lastowka 2007). It is important to note that despite the rhetoric,
nothing here is really 'private'; these property rights are granted by the state, and the contracts that deal
with them are enforced with the full coercive power of the state (Mason & Gageler 1987). 
The conventional legal view of private governance, then, is that the terms of the contract govern access to
the platform, and it is only through these terms that users have any legal rights. The contract, in turn,
generally assigns absolute or near-absolute discretion to the platform owner to unilaterally terminate any
rights of access. The ultimate effect is that any dispute over the ways in which platforms are governed are,
by definition, non-legal. In general terms, participants have no recourse to the procedures of the legal
system and the coercive power of the state. Even the rhetoric of public rights is largely delegitimized by
the rhetoric of private property and contractual terms. The structural features of the legal system firmly
position ongoing debates about platform governance as an issue to be negotiated with the platform
operators, rather than as a public political question.
This structural framing of relationships between users and platforms is deeply problematic. Individuals
and groups of users face systemic inequalities in negotiating for the recognition of rights against large
commercial providers: there is good evidence that individuals are unable to adequately value inchoate
future rights, there is little competition between different rulesets, and users are constrained in their power
to exit established networks (Centre for International Governance Innovation 2016). On utilitarian
grounds, these contracts are simply unlikely to ever reflect an optimal bargain. Since these contracts are
not effectively bargained for, it can hardly be said that the interests of users are well represented. The fine
print of standard form contracts cannot be said to be assented to in any real sense (Llewellyn 1960; Radin
2005).  
In all cases examined, the Terms of Service provided broad, unfettered discretion to platform owners.
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This is a serious failing from the perspective of the rule of law. Like constitutional documents, Terms of
Service grant powers; but unlike constitutions, they rarely limit those powers or regulate the ways they
are exercised. Throughout recorded history, this basic conception of the rule of law has been seen as
important to help ward off tyrannical governance (Tamanaha 2004, pp.138–9). This concern does not
dissipate simply because the loci of governance tensions move online to private platforms. The ways in
which platforms are governed has a fundamental impact on the social lives of users in ways that is not just
private in nature – on any moderately thick view of rights, private governance necessarily implicates
basic values of communication, education, access to knowledge, sociability and play (see e.g. Sen 1999;
Nussbaum 2011). 
This analysis suggests that at least for some platforms, we ought to be concerned about the arbitrary or
malicious exercise of power by the providers and their delegates. All of the other interests that users
might have in participating in online social spaces hinge, ultimately, on access. Clearly too platforms have
a legitimate interest in being able to determine membership – much of the character of shared social
spaces has to do with the participants who make up the community or who have access to the platform.
Without making any claims about the substantive rules at stake, about who may join and continue to
participate, we can at least suggest that a fundamental requirement of legitimate governance is that if a
participant is denied access, that should be done according to the rules. The extensive powers that
platforms reserve to themselves to unilaterally determine continued access are deeply problematic
because they directly reject the fundamental proposition that governance power ought to be limited and
not arbitrary.
B Formal legality
Beyond the general prohibition on arbitrary punishment, the most commonly agreed principles of the rule
of law are procedural protections. These are thought of as 'thin' conceptions of the rule of law, on the basis
that they do not include the substantive rights of citizens. These procedural safeguards are assumed to be
more universalizable than the messier task of agreeing on fundamental substantive rights. While these
conceptions of the rule of law are not uncontroversial, they do provide a useful starting point – they are
the lowest common denominator of almost all rule of law theory. “Above all else”, this conception of the
rule of law “is about predictability.” (Tamanaha 2004, p.114) Broadly speaking, it can be categorized into
a set of procedural safeguards: that rules are clear; there are rules governing change; they apply equally
and predictably; and there are fair processes to appeal. While there are other values that may make up
‘thicker’ conceptions of the rule of law, these of ‘due process’ or ‘natural justice’ are generally accepted as
“a necessary, albeit not sufficient condition for the realization of almost any defensible conception of the
rule of law.” (Trebilcock & Daniels 2008, p.30)
Immediately, Terms of Service present a clear problem on clarity. Many of the documents I examined
were written in a style that was not designed to be read or understood by users. A recent experimental
study confirms what is generally assumed – users of social networking sites overwhelmingly do not read
the Terms of Service (Obar & Oeldorf-Hirsch 2016). In recent times, some platforms have worked to
simplify their Terms of Service. More than half of the documents examined used more accessible, ‘plain-
English’ drafting – which is a major change in ToS documents over the last decade. Many of the
documents, though, are still too long and too complex to be easily understood by a lay audience. A
handful of platforms (Twitter, Pinterest, Tumblr, Tagged) use simple annotations in their terms. This too is
a recent change – most of these annotations began to appear over the last two to three years. iv This is a
very important move that should be applauded; the annotated versions are substantially easier to read than
other contractual documents. Other platforms create more accessible versions of the important rules that
users are expected to follow as ‘community guidelines’ or similar documents that are simpler to
understand. While these set out the rules that users are expected to follow, they often have little legal
weight. The Terms of Service documents themselves may refer to these guidelines, but they are never
expressed to be exclusive. That is, platforms reserve the discretion to enforce different, as yet-unwritten
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rules, should the need arise. For many platforms, the Terms of Service are made significantly more
complicated by referring and incorporating other documents like these, including guidelines, privacy
policies, advertising policies, and more.
Not only are Terms of Service often unclear, but they are all able to be changed by the unilateral decision
of the platform. Approximately half of the platforms committed to some responsibility to inform users
that their terms had changed, either through email or a notice posted on the site itself. Only Facebook
commits to providing users with an opportunity to review and comment on changes before they come into
force, but its commitment to a democratic voting mechanism has been removed. Remarkably, several of
the platforms examined do not commit themselves to drawing changes to the attention of users, instead
requiring users to bear responsibility for continuously checking the legal terms to see whether they may
have changed.
Apart from changes in policy, the arbitrariness, or perceived arbitrariness, of the way that platforms make
decisions is a key source of the anxiety around governance. Many of the ongoing disputes over
Facebook's policies of acceptable conduct, for example, reflect a deep concern with the way the policies
are interpreted. Mothers whose breastfeeding photos are removed wonder how exactly Facebook's
complaints team enforce their rule against 'pornography' in a way that distinguishes, in Facebook's
explanation, between mothers genuinely sharing their experiences and “pictures of naked women who
happen to be holding a baby” (Facebook spokesman Barry Schnitt, quoted in Ingram 2011). Over years of
complaints by mothers and advocacy groups, Facebook has clarified their position somewhat, noting that
it will respond to complaints and remove “Photos that show a fully exposed breast where the child is not
actively engaged in nursing” (Facebook n.d.). What exactly 'actively engaged' means remains contested
(Ibrahim 2010).
Policies and rules are always imprecisely interpreted and applied. The very fact that they are expressed in
language, which can only imperfectly describe practice, means that there will always be some degree of
uncertainty (Hart 1961). The way that legal systems deal with this uncertainty is to develop procedural
safeguards that ensure, as far as practicable, that decision makers are impartial, that the reasons upon
which they make decisions are transparent, that the discretion they exercise is curtailed within defined
bounds, and, if something goes wrong, that there are procedures to appeal the decision to an independent
body. This is one of the basic tenets of procedural fairness or due process, a fundamental component of
the rule of law (Fuller 1969).
Challenging the decisions platforms make is generally extremely difficult. Terms of Service rarely
constrain the power of platforms to make decisions as they see fit. In addition to allowing platforms to
terminate entire user accounts, all of the terms of service studied reserve power to the platform to remove
any content that users post to the sites. Most Terms of Service express this in quite broad terms – that
platforms can remove content at their 'sole discretion' or 'belief' that it violates their policies. Some
platforms go even further, expressly reserving the right to remove 'any' content at any time; LinkedIn's
terms, for example, state that “We are not obligated to publish any information or content on our Service
and can remove it in our sole discretion, with or without notice.” 
For the subset of platforms that promise only to remove content that violates their Terms of Service, users
have only a slim possibility of appealing decisions they disagree with. None of the Terms establish any
formal internal dispute resolution mechanism, but users can seek to challenge enforcement of the Terms
in court or through arbitration. Six of the Terms studied required users to submit to binding arbitration,
although for three of those, the platform agreed to pay the costs. Arbitration can reduce the costs of
hearing disputes, but arbitration proceedings tend to favor the large repeat players over individual
consumers if they are not carefully designed to promote consumer rights (Wilson 2016). Almost all Terms
required users to resolve disputes in the platform's home jurisdiction. This is particularly problematic,
since it imposes a heavy cost on users to travel in order to bring a claim. A small number of Terms seek to
prohibit users from bringing class actions to reduce the individual costs of bringing many similar claims.
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Even if a claim is successfully brought, all platforms limit their potential liability for any wrongdoing.
Because rules about limitations of liability differ in different jurisdictions, this is usually expressed as a
complete limitation or, alternatively, limited to a monetary maximum of $100 or similar. The cumulative
effect of all this drafting is that generally, users have no realistic chance of challenging decisions made by
platforms in any formal legal process.
In purely formal terms, we can see how the Terms of Service of major platforms are almost universally
designed to maximize their discretionary power and minimize their accountability. Through the lens of
the rule of law, we can see how this is immediately problematic. At a general level, Terms of Service
documents of platforms fall well short of accepted standards of good governance because they, almost
universally, do nothing to restrain the platform's exercise of power. As constitutional documents, Terms of
Service fail to provide meaningful safeguards against arbitrary or capricious decisions. In procedural
terms, they generally do not provide the clarity that is required to guide behavior, they provide no
protection from unilateral changes in rules, do nothing to ensure that decisions are made according to the
rules, and present no meaningful avenues for appeal. 
This formal critique is a useful starting point. The legal Terms of Service of platforms matter not because
they are often enforced through legal mechanisms (they are not), but because they set a baseline for
disputes over governance. They are a discursive reference point for the politics of negotiation as norms
are continuously constructed and contested between groups of users and owners of platforms. Contractual
Terms of Service also set the ultimate outer legal bounds of platform power; they set the limits of
discretion in governance that can ultimately be enforced by territorial courts (Suzor 2010).
The preliminary implications of this analysis are that consumer contracts are poor ways to articulate the
rights of users and the responsibilities of platforms. But the next step in evaluating the legitimacy of
governance must be to examine how it plays out in practice. This work is hindered by the difficulty in
obtaining good data about the decisions that platforms make. Content moderation and other governance
processes are opaque (Pasquale 2015), and often seem to be largely ad hoc (Buni & Chemal 2016). While
all platforms have 'guidelines' about acceptable content and behavior, these are not necessarily enforced in
any consistent way – and there is no easy way for users to see whether rules are being consistently
enforced. This lack of transparency feeds distrust of the content moderation process (Anderson et al.
2016). Users often are only able to glean some insight about how decisions are made by piecing together
the anecdotal experiences of other users, or from the assumedly sanitized information provided by
platforms themselves. 
Sometimes, more details have emerged from other sources. In 2012, for example, Gawker were able to
obtain two leaked versions of the manual of procedures that Facebook provided to its outsourced
moderators at the time (Chen 2012). The manuals are an instructional grab bag of content Facebook
deems to be acceptable and not acceptable. Some of the distinctions themselves reflect Facebook's
particular stance on contested topics: photos of illegal drugs are prohibited, but marijuana is expressly
permitted; female nipples are prohibited, but male nipples are not; obvious 'camel toes' are prohibited but
crushed heads “are ok as long as no insides are showing” (oDesk 2012). The problem is more
generalizable: there is a deep anxiety that the rules about what is permissible in digital social spaces
represent the cumulative value judgments of an elite group of Silicon Valley insiders (Rosen 2013). The
very real threat is that both the content of the rules and the procedures through which they are enforced
support and perpetuate the oppression of marginalized groups (Barbrook & Cameron 1996).
A fuller analysis of the legitimacy of governance requires an examination of the bias, error, and prejudice
in the enforcement of decisions in practice. In conventional articulations of the rule of law, this is usually
articulated as a distrust of errors that inevitably flow from fallible human decisionmaking. In a digital
context, however, we must also add a distrust of automated decisionmaking. Responsibility for enforcing
rules, for constraining action, for selecting, hiding, and amplifying content in online networks is
delegated, in whole or in part, to algorithmic systems that are often inscrutable to users. These systems
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necessarily incorporate assumptions and biases about the social world and their inputs that will inevitably
lead to problematic results. The task of evaluating the legitimacy of decisionmaking, then, will require
new methods of holding platforms to account – both in terms of human processes, and in terms of the
design and operation of the algorithms that are employed to govern users. The next stage of this process
will likely require innovations in independent external auditing and experimentation (Sandvig et al. 2014;
Perel & Elkin-Koren 2016) and enhanced transparency and accountability from platforms themselves in
order to identify systemic errors and inequalities (Pasquale 2015).
PART IV RULE OF LAW, NOT OF INDIVIDUALS
The values of the rule of law provide a useful reference point in analyzing how platforms govern. Most
importantly, however, the values of the rule of law provide a way to talk and think about the growing but
amorphous set of concerns about the appropriate normative limits of the power of platforms. The rule of
law, as an ideal that is never reachable but is still worth pursuing, is a vision that “to live under the rule of
law is not to be subject to the unpredictable vagaries of other individuals – whether monarchs, judges,
government officials, or fellow citizens. It is to be shielded from the familiar human weaknesses of bias,
passion, prejudice, error, ignorance, cupidity, or whim” (Tamanaha 2004, p.122). 
From this ideal, it becomes possible to articulate with some greater precision what is at stake when
platforms govern our shared online social spaces. Constitutionalism is fundamentally about the limitation
of governance power; 'digital constitutionalism' requires a very messy contestation of the appropriate
ways in which the power of platforms ought to be limited. This is an inherently political task, and there
can be no common agreement on the exact shape of either substantive or procedural limitations on the
power of platforms. This is, in part, why the concept of rights is so difficult to apply to the governance of
platforms. Unlike territorial states, that must fairly accommodate the interests of all their citizens, digital
platforms can cater to the specific needs of smaller communities. The universalizing language of rights
that apply in all situations threatens a vision of a diverse, flourishing online environment of almost
infinite possibility (Johnson & Post 1995; Balkin 2004). While it is important to recognize the limits of
this liberal utopian vision, there is a clearly valid concern that a thick universal conception of legitimacy
in governance could come at too high a cost for autonomy. 
Constitutionalism does not, however, depend upon a full overarching political framework (Huggins
2017). So-called 'thin constitutionalism' provides a way to focus on legitimacy in discrete contexts. It is
possible, for example, to talk about how decisions are made and reviewed without having all of the
structures of constitutional government (Klabbers 2004). The core principles of the rule of law provide
the language that is needed to engage in the ongoing and deeply contested political discussion about how
we imagine the future of our shared online social spaces. In this sense, the values of the rule of law are
not prescriptive – we would not want to envisage a future where all platforms are held to the same
standards of legitimacy as territorial states (Suzor 2012).
'Digital constitutionalism' means paying attention to a set of core governance concerns, without assuming
the necessity of any of them. As an initial starting point, we can categorize the values of the rule of law
into five sets of concerns: 
• Meaningful consent: legitimacy, at its core, depends upon some consensus that the regulator has a
right to govern in the way that it does (Black 2008). This is a claim that social rules represent
some defensible vision of the common good (Allan 2001). With respect to territorial governments,
consent is often manifested through democracy, but for digital platforms, full democracy is not
required (or even desirable) in all cases (Doctorow 2007). What is required is consent, in a real,
meaningful sense, not in the illusory sense that users sign up without reading the Terms of Service
and are therefore assumed to have consented to their contents (Radin 2005; Lemley 2006).
Consent, in a meaningful sense, requires the important rules to be clear, well-known, and not
surprising. It requires some genuine consultation on changes, and real opportunities for users to
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exit a platform without losing the labor they invested or the capacity to communicate with their
social contacts.
• Transparency: legitimacy requires some degree of accountability for the exercise of power.
Legitimacy can be thought of as partly constructed through the discursive process of
accountability; a regulator gains legitimacy by rendering account to stakeholders who are able to
hold it to some standard (Black 2008). Transparency at an aggregate level is a pre-requisite for the
political conversation about the responsibilities that platforms have to govern their networks in
particular ways (Gillespie 2017). As a starting point, we should seriously consider what
responsibilities platforms ought to have to provide useful summaries and particular details about
actions they take to enforce their rules (Kaye 2016).
• Equality and predictability: the basic procedural requirement of the rule of law is that rules are 
applied uniformly and not arbitrarily (Dicey 1959). At a minimum, this means that users should be
aware of the reasons upon which decisions that affect them are made (Kingsbury et al. 2005). It 
also implies that rules should be fairly and equally enforced, and should be stable enough to guide 
behavior. This is often the aspect of legitimacy that is most at play in contests over how platforms 
govern their networks. As platforms grow to a massive size, there are frequent conflicts over the 
conception and practice of neutrality. Many of the major controversies over governance of recent 
years are rooted in disagreements over perceptions that a platform is biased or discriminating 
against some group of users or promoting some opinions over others, particularly but not 
exclusively on the basis of race, gender, sexuality, and political speech.
• Due process: the final procedural component of the rule of law is that there is some mechanism to
resolve disputes. In part this requires that before a regulatory decision is made, it is made
according to valid criteria and processes. Once a decision has been made, due process then
requires that users who are adversely affected have some avenue of appeal and independent
review.
• Substantive human rights: The final, and perhaps most contested category, is a broad category that
encompasses what are thought of as basic human rights. There is an increasing recognition that
private digital platforms, have some role to play in promoting and protecting the human rights of
the people who use and are impacted by them. There is not yet, however, much consensus about
how much responsibility platforms have, or what shape that responsibility should take. In other
'thin' conceptions of the rule of law, substantive rights are left out because of the inherent
difficulty in agreeing on their content. But like the other values above, it suffices to say that basic
human rights are definitely implicated in governance by platforms, and it will continue to be
important to be able to articulate how the actions of private regulators can have a very significant
impact on the ability of individual users to exercise their rights and be free from interference.
These values are not the only values upon which to judge the governance of platforms, nor do they all
necessarily apply to all cases. But they do provide a language to name and work through the loose set of
often inchoate concerns about the relationship between platforms and their users. This is a necessary
precondition to an increasingly urgent task. Platforms play a vital role in governing important parts of the
daily lives of billions of individuals. The legal mechanisms that we have for protecting civil and political
rights do not translate well to governance by platforms. The law of contract, which currently regulates
these relationships, does not address these governance concerns. In this gap, we have an opportunity to
develop a normative understanding of the responsibilities of platforms. This is an opportunity to set out
the constitutional principles that we collectively believe ought to underpin our shared social spaces in the
digital age. This work is necessarily contested, inherently political, and complicated by different
contextual and cultural considerations. But it can only be progressed with a clearer understanding of the
values that are at stake. The values of the rule of law – values of good governance – provide a way to
conceptualize governance by platforms in constitutional terms. This is the key challenge and opportunity
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iii As measured by http://www.ebizmba.com/articles/social-networking-websites. This ranking averages Alexa Global Traffic 
Rank, and U.S. Traffic Rank from both Compete and Quantcast. The sites selected were: Facebook, Twitter, Linkedin, 
Pinterest, Google+, Instagram, Tumblr, VK, Flickr, Vine, Meetup, Tagged, MeetMe, ClassMates, and Ask.fm. 
iv Note that LinkedIn’s terms were changed to use much simpler language, including annotations, after the date that terms 
were collected for this study.
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